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DEFENCE 




MAJOR GENERAL PROCTOR, 



TRIED AT MONTREAL 



BY A 



GENERAL COURT MARTIAL, 



UPON CHARGES 



AFFECTING HIS CHARACTER AS A SOLDIER, 



Jcc &c. &c. 



IHontrcnl: 

PRINTED BY lOHN LOVELL, ST. NICHOLAS STREET. 

1842. 



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CHARGES 

EXHIBITED AGAINST 

MAJOR GENERAL HENRY PROCTOR, 

LIEUT. COL. OF THE 41st REGIMENT OF FOOT, 

VIZ : 

FIRST CHARGE. 

That the said Major General Proctor, being in- 
trusted with the Right Division of the Army serving 
in the Canadas, and the retreat of the said Division 
from ihe western parts of Upper Canada having 
become unavoidable, from the loss of the Fleet on 
Lake Erie, on the 10th September, 1813, did not 
immediately after the loss of the said Fleet was 
known by him, make the military arrangements best 
calculated for promptly effecting such retreat, and 
unnecessarily delayed to commence the same until 
the evening of the 27th of the said month, on which 
day the enemy had landed in considerable force 
within a short distance of Sandwich, the Head 
Quarters of the said Division;— such conduct on 
the part of the said JMajor General Proctor endan- 
gering the safety of the troops under his command, 
by exposing them to be attacked by a force far su- 
perior to them, being contrary to his duty as an ofli- 
cer, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, 
and contrary to the Articles of War. 



SECOND CHARGE. 

That the said Major General Proctor, after com- 
mencing the retreat of the said Division, on the said 
27th September, although he had reason to believe 
that the enemy would immediately follow it, with 
very superior numbers, and endeavour to harrass 
and impede its march, did not use due expedition, 
or take the proper measures for conducting the said 
retreat, having encumbered the said Division with 
large quantities of useless baggage, having unne- 
cessarily halted the troops for several whole days, 
and having omitted to destroy the bridges over 
which the enemy would be obliged to pass, thereby 
affording them the opportunity to come up with the 
said Division ;— such conduct betraying great pro- 
fessional incapacity on the part of the said Major 
General Proctor, being contrary to his duty as an 
oflficer, prejudicial to good order and military disci- 
pline, and contrary to the Articles of War. 

THIRD CHARGE. 

That the said Major General Proctor did not 
take the necessary measures for aff'ording security 
to the boats, waggons, and carts, laden with the 
ammunition, stores, and provisions, required for 
the troops on their retreat, and allowed the said 
boats, waggons, and carts, on the 4th and 5th of 
October, 1813, to remain in the rear of the said 
Division, without a sufficient force to protect them, 
whereby the whole, or the greater part of the said 
ammunition, stores, and provisions, either fell into 
the enemy's hands, or were destroyed to prevent 
their capture,— and the troops were without provi- 
sions for a whole day, previous to their being at- 



tacked on the said 5tli October ; — such conduct on 
the part of the said ^^ajor General Proctor being 
contrary to his duty as an officer, prejudicial to 
good order and military discipline, and contrary to 
the Articles of War. 

FOURTH CHARGE. 

That the said IMajor General Proctor, having as- 
sured the Indian Chiefs in council, at Amherstburgh, 
as an inducement to them and their warriors to ac- 
company the said Division in its retreat, that on their 
arrival at Chatham they should find the forks of the 
Thames fortified, did nevertheless neglect to fortify 
the same, or to take up a position either there or at 
Caldwell's JMill Dam, both of which were positions 
extremely favourable for retarding the advance of 
the enemy ; that he also neglected to occupy the 
heights above the Moravian village, although he had 
previously removed his ordnance, with the exception 
of one six-pounder to that position ; whereby, throw-^ 
ing up works, he might have awaited the attack of 
the enemy, and engaged them to great advantage,^ 
and that after the intelligence had reached him of 
the approach of the enemy on the moi-ning of the 
said 5th of October, he halted the said Division, 
notwithstanding it was within two miles of the said 
village, and formed it in a situation highly unfa- 
vourable for receiving the attack which afterwards 
took place ; — such conduct manifesting great pro- 
fessional incapacity, on the part of the said IMajor 
General Proctor, being contrary to his duty as an 
officer, prejudicial to good order and military disci- 
pline, and contrary to the Articles of War. 

FIFTH CHARGE. 

That the said Major General Proctor, did not, 
either prior to or subsequent to the attack by the 



enemy on the said Division, on the said 5th of Oc- 
tober, make the mihtary dispositions best adapted 
to meet or to resist the said attack, and that, during 
the action and after the troops had given way, he 
did not make any effectual attempt, in his own per- 
son or otherwise, to rally or encourage them, or to 
co-operate with and support the Indians who were 
engaged with the enemy on the right, the said Major 
General Proctor having quitted the field soon after 
the action commenced ; — such conduct betraying 
great professional incapacity, tending to the defeat 
and dishonour of His Majesty's Arms, to the sacri- 
fice of the division of the Army committed to his 
charge, being in violation of his dut}" and unbecom- 
ing and disgraceful to his character as an officer, 
prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and 
contrary to the Articles of War. 

(Signed) EDWARD BAYNES, 

Adjt. General, 
JVorth America, 

(Signed) E. B. BRENTON, 

Defy. Judge Advocate, 

B. J\\ America. 



THE DEFENX^E. 

J^Ir. President and Gentleinen of this Honourable Court : 

The moment which I have so long and so 
anxiously looked for, is at last arrived. An oppor- 
tunity is now afforded me of vindicating myself from 
the secret aspersions and open attacks to which my 
character has been exposed. 

To the imputations thrown upon me, supported 
as they appeared to be by high official authority, I 
have been hitherto silent ; no other direct means of 
obtaining redress existed, except those which I have 
adopted. 

I did not — I could not, even for the purpose of 
removing error, — descend to any of the means which 
are sometimes used, for biassing public opinion. 

From my friends, from those whose good opinion 
was most dear to me, I asked only a suspension of 
their judgment until I could obtain a trial. The 
torrent was left to expend itself. I relied upon the 
justice of my Government. I knew that the birth- 
right of the meanest of my fellow-subjects would not 
be denied to me. 1 knew that an honourable and 
impartial tribunal would be afforded me, who would 
hear, and weigh, and examine, before they deter- 
mined, — who would not dip their hands in innocent 
blood, and offer me up as a propitiatory sacrifice at 
the altar of popular clamour. 

In this i-eliance upon the justice of my Govern- 
ment, I have not been mistaken. 

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been 
graciously pleased to listen to my prayer for a strict 
investigation of my conduct. Distance and peculiar 
circumstances, not now necessary to enter upon, 



have produced delays and obstacles, whicli are, 
however, at last happily surmounted. 

The day has come, which, in prospect, has 
cheered and supported me, through the gloom and 
darkness of the last twelve months. 

You, gentlemen, have in your hands the honour 
of an olhcer, who has served with unimpeached 
character, for more than two and thirtv vears. 

The patience and attention with which the invcs- 
tiiration has been hitherto conducted, afford the 
surest pledges, if any were wanting, that you will 
listen with attention to what I have to offer in an- 
swer to the matter contained in the chars;es. 

However anxious I may be to take up as little of 
the time of the Court as possible, the charges em- 
brace views and circumstances of so lar^e an ex- 
tent that the bare statement of them would occupy 
no inconsiderable time. 

If I understand the first charge, explained as it is 
by the opening address of the Judge Advocate, and 
the general bearing of the questions put by the pro- 
secutor, (for, from its extreme vagueness, it requires 
these explanations,) I am accused in it of a derelic- 
tion of duty, in not having, immediately after the 
loss of the ileet was kno^vn to me, taken the neces- 
sary measures for promptly effecting the retreat of 
the Division under my command, to Delaware, or to 
some other point nearer the centre Division, where 
I miLrht have been in communication with that Divi- 
sion, and have afforded to it a seasonable relief; and 
of unnecessarily delaying the said retreat to the 
twenty-seventh of September, on which day the 
enemy had landed in considerable force, within a 
short distance of the Head Quarters of the Division, 
thereby endangering the safety of the Troops under 



my command, by exposing them to be attacked by a 
force far superior to them. 

To this charge my answer is contained in one 
sentence. My determination was to retreat to the 
Thames, and no farther. It is obvious, that the line 
of conduct which would be expedient and proper, if 
my intention had been to abandon the district en- 
trusted to my command, would be most unwise; my 
intention being to remain in it. This, then, is the 
standard by which my conduct is to be measured ; 
and the main question to which the attention of the 
Court will a2;ain and a^ain be called, in the consi- 
deration of this and the succeeding charges, here 
more immediately arises. In adopting this resolu- 
tion, was I determined by no adequate reasons 7 
Did I manifest gross ignorance or culpable inatten- 
tion 7 On the other hand, was it not under the 
trying and difficult circumstances in which I was 
placed, the only resolution which was at once con- 
sistent with honour and policy 7 

The representations of Commodore Barclay to 
Sir James, yea and of myself to his Excellency the 
Commander of the Forces, relative to the want of 
seamen for the service of Lake Erie, had been 
equally unavailing. And, notwithstanding the defi- 
ciency of seamen on board our Fleet, such was the 
want of provisions and the necessity of obtaining a 
supply of water, that Commodore Barclay, with my 
entire concurrence, determined to attempt to open 
the communication to Long Pointe — he receivinor 
from me every assistance in my power. 

The fort of Amherst was deprived of its artillery 
to supply the Fleet with guns, and one hundred and 
fifty soldiers were put on board the Fleet to act 
as seamen. I need not recal to the recollection of 
the Court the result of the engagement which after- 



10 

wards look place, when the smalhiess of the number 
of our seamen deprived Commodore Barclay of the 
just reward of his skill and courage. A retreat it is 
admitted by all, became then inevitable. But was 
the retreat to be made to the Thames or to Dela- 
ware, and the centre Division ? 

I entreat the attention of the Court to the reasons 
which determined me to retreat to the Thames, and 
there to make a stand, and to the measures which I 
adopted in consequence. When the intelligence of 
the loss of the Fleet was received, there were at 
least from two to three thousand Indian warriors 
within the district which I commanded, having with 
them their wives and families. The faith of the 
Government had been pledged to them, and the 
abandonment of the district would have been con- 
sidered by them as a forfeiture of that pledge. It 
was seriously to be apprehended that the adoption 
of this measure would have rendered them our most 
inveterate enemies. The consequence of their 
hostility, not only to the small Division under my 
command, but also to the peaceable inhabitants, 
may be easily conceived. I directed a Council of 
the Indian Chiefs to be convened, and the contu- 
melious speech of the Chief Tecumseh, in answer 
to a proposal made through Colonel Elliot, superin- 
tendant of the Indian Department, to fall back upon 
the Thames, strongly exhibits their feelings. This 
Council was held on the fifteenth of September, and 
an answer was promised on the eighteenth. 

Colonel Elliot, and the other individuals of the 
Department, were directed, in the meantime, to use 
their inlluence with Tecumseh, and the other 
Chiefs. 

On my arrival at Amherstburgh, I found Colonel 
Elliot alarmed beyond measure, having wholly failed 



11 

in his endeavours to convince or persuade the 
Chiefs. He told me to prepare myself for conse- 
quences the most unpleasant, and that on my ex- 
pressing my determination to retreat, the Great 
Wampum Belt, in the centre of \vhich was the figure 
of a heart, and at each end that of a hand, would be 
produced in the Council, and, in our presence, cut 
in two, figuratively representing our eternal separa- 
tion. I then resolved myself to state to Tecumseh 
the reasons which had deterniincd me. In the pre- 
sence of Lieutenant Colonels AVarburton, Elliot, 
and my own Staff, and several others, with the aid 
of a map, I so thoroughly convinced him of the ex- 
pediency of the measure proposed, and of my deter- 
mination not to desert the Indian body, that, when 
the Council had assembled in the course of two 
hours, he had brought the greater portion of the 
chiefs and nations into my proposal, and effectually 
prevented any opposition of moment. If I had at- 
tempted to retreat beyond the Thames, the great 
wampum belt would have been cut. The British 
influence with the natives would have been for ever 
extinguished, through a large portion of the conti- 
nent. The individur.ls by whom that influence is 
supported and kept up, would have been destroyed, 
and our most formidable enemy would have been 
those who, but the day before, w^ere our friends. 
This is the first reason which induced me to retreat 
beyond the Thames. 

A second reason, and almost equally cogent, was, 
that if I could succeed in maintaining a position 
upon the Thames, I should be enabled to preserve 
the naval and military stores, and thereby facilitate 
the recovery of a naval ascendancy on Lake Erie. 
As they could be conveyed in vessels and boats to a 
depot upon the Thames, no time was lost, and in the 

B 



12 

event of our being obliged to retire farther, they 
might be destroyed. 

The prosecution reprehends my conduct in this 
particular, as if the abandonment and destruction of 
stores was an essential part of a retreat, and not 
acts justified only by imperious necessity. 

A third reason was, that, retreating to the Thames, 
the Division had in its rear the rich and fertile coun- 
try around Long and Turkey Points, to furnish it 
with provisions, and the enemy were prevented 
from obtaining from that country supplies for their 
army and garrisons. 

Let one rapid glance be cast upon the other side 
of the picture. 

If I had attempted to retreat to the Centre Divi- 
sion, not only would the Lidian tribes have been ren- 
dered hostile to us, — not only would I have sacri- 
ficed an immense territory, and all its military and 
naval stores, without an effort, — but, in all proba- 
bility, I should have brought upon the Centre Divi- 
sion the army by which I was attacked ;^ and it will 
be recollected, that in the language of an official 
communication of the 19th September, 1813, — 
" That army was placed in a situation very critical, 
and one novel in the system of war, that of investing 
a force vastly superior in numbers within a strongly 
entrenched poshion." 

But to close this part of the subject with a fact 
which, after all the blame which it has been at- 
tempted to fix upon me for not retreating from the 
western parts of the Province, will be heard with 
surprise. I communicated to his Excellency the 
Commander of the Forces my determination to re- 
treat to the Thames, and there to make a stand, and 
was answered by his Excellency in his despatch of 
the 6th of October, 1813, in these words : " 1 en- 



13 

lirely approve of your dctcrminalion consequent upon 
this disastrous event, (the loss of the Fleet on Lake 
Erie,) of your making a stand upon the Thames, 
and have the fullest reliance on the zeal and ability 
you have hitherto manifested, to conduct your retreat, 
so as to afford the enemy no decided advantage 
over you. I recommend to you to persevere in the 
conduct you are observing of conciliating the Indians 
by every means in your power." My determination 
then to retreat to the Thames, and there to make a 
stand, was dictated by honour and policy, enforced 
by necessity, and approved of by his Excellency the 
Commander of the Forces. 

What were the arrangements made by me in con- 
sequence ? 

One of the first objects was to secure the assist- 
ance of the Indian body ; they were naturally sus- 
picious of any retrograde movements, and the influ- 
ence of the Indian Department had been greatly 
lessened with them in consequence of the small sup- 
ply of presents which had been afforded. 

I have already detailed the difficulties which I had 
to encounter before this object was attained. 

To have dismantled the fort of Amherst, or to 
have withdrawn the troops from that fort, without 
the concurrence of the Indians, would have pro- 
duced their secession, perhaps hostility. 

The sick, together with the women and children 
belonging to the Division, were sent to the Moravian 
Town. 

The naval and military stores were sent by water, 
in vessels and boats, to tlie Thames. 

Orders were given to the officers of the Artillery 
and Quarter Master General's Department, to pro- 
vide such means of land carriage as they in their 
discretion might think necessary, and funds were 



14 

provided, depots with ovens were formed at proper 
distances. Instructions were given to the Commis- 
sariat for provisioning the troops. I had even writ- 
ten to Colonel Talbot, at Long Point, commanding 
the militia in that District, to send to the Thames 
whatever articles of food there midit be within his 
reach, and to have the roads through the wilder- 
ness as far as possible repaired, to facilitate the con- 
veyance of them. Colonel Baby, of the Militia 
Staff, was directed to have the bridges repaired 
between Sandwich and the Thames, for the passage 
of the troops upon the retreat. The fort of Amherst 
was dismantled, and its garrison withdrawn ; Dra- 
goons were stationed between Sandwich, Amherst- 
i)urgh, and below this last place, to give the earliest 
intelligence of the appearance of the enem.y and of 
their landing, as it w^as inexpedient to let the enemy 
know, as long as it could be avoided, our intention 
to retreat, and as the garrison at Detroit could, at the 
shortest notice, be conveyed to Sandwich, the aban- 
donment of that fort was delayed to the last moment, 
and on the 27th orders were given to JMajor ]\fuir, 
commanding there, to destroy the public buildings 
and cross to our side. 

Were not these the necessary arran2;ements which 
the circumstances dictated. 

And what were the arrangements best calculated 
for promptly effecting the retreat which I omitted to 
make? 

1 ought to have found an answer to this question 
in the charge itself, otherwise I have not a specifica- 
tion of the particular offence of which I am accused, 
and against which I am called upon to defend my- 
self, a specification which the first principles of na- 
tural justice, recognized in all countries require. 
For no strength can entirely protect from a stroke 
aimed in the dark. 



15 

BuL I am charged with having unnecessarily de- 
layed to commence the retreat until the evening of 
the 27th of September. The main body of the In- 
dians arrived at the Thames only on the evening of 
the 30th. If I had commenced the retreat earlier, 
the naval and military stores could not have been 
conveyed to the Thames, but must have been de- 
stroyed at Amherstburgh. Besides there was no 
reason to apprehend a speedy attack of the enemv. 
It was not to be thought that the loss of the squadron 
could affect me so immediately as to render a pre- 
cipitate retrograde movement necessary. 

It was thought that after an action of an hour and 
a half, the enemy's vessels must have sustained so 
much damage as not to be in a situation to undertake 
any thing farther for some time. 

This last view is fully disclosed in a despatch from 
Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, Deputy Assistant Adju- 
tant General with the Centre Division, to me, dated 
the 17th September, 1813. 

The retreat could not then have been commenced 
before the 27th September, 1813, without making 
sacrifices of the greatest magnitude ; but I should 
not have been justiticd in commencing my retreat 
before the enemy landed. 

It was by no means certain that the enemy would 
land on the western territory. 

Serious apprehensions w^ere entertained that the 
enemy would land at Long Point, get in rear of the 
Centre Division, and take possession of the stores 
at Burlington. The only obstacle to their so doing 
was that their own western frontier would be ex- 
posed to the incursions of the Indians and to the at- 
tack of the troops of the Right Division. This view 
is in like manner fully stated in another letter from 
Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, dated 6th September, 



16 



IS 13. Retreating with the Right Division and 
breaking the Indian Alhance, this obstacle would 
have been removed. 

Is it not then plain, that I stand accused for not 
doing that, which, if I had done, my life would 
have been too cheap a forfeit to my country? 

The charge concludes with stating that the con- 
duct animadverted upon in it, endangered the safety 
of the troops under my command, by exposing them 
to be attacked by a force far superior to them. At 
no time during the retreat had I reason to suppose 
that the number of the enemy w^as greater than three 
thousand men. The Dragoon officer stationed be- 
low Amherstburgh reported that number, and so 
low down as the 5th October, j\Iajor Chambers 
reported the same number. 

The Indian body, it has been already stated, 
amounted from two to three thousand w^arriors. 
My regular troops were the same of which, in the 
beginning of the year, a portion had advanced into 
the enemy's country, beaten a division of their 
army, and taken twice their own number in prison- 
ers. The objects to contend for were of the high- 
est importance. 

Were all these considerations which did not fall 
within the province of arithmetic, to be excluded 7 
Was the honour of the Army, — the faith pledged to 
the Indians, — the sacrifice of an immense territory, — 
of an inland sea, — die relative operations of two 
divisions upon so extensive a line, — to be determined 
by the numeration table ? 
' It will not be necessary for me to occupy so much 
of the time of the Court with the remaining four 
charges. 

The second, third, and fourth charges are so in- 
timately connected, that to consider them sepa- 



17 

rately would produce repetitions and distract the 

view. 

I am accused in them, first, of having encumbered 
the Division with large quantities of useless baggage ; 
secondly, of having unnecessarily halted the troops 
for several whole days ; thirdly, of having omitted 
to destroy the bridges over which the enemy would 
be obliged to pass ; fourthly, of not having taken 
the necessary measures for affording security to the 
boats, waggons, and carts laden with the ammuni- 
tion, stores, and provisions required for the troops 
on their retreat, and allowing the said boats, wag- 
gons, and carts, on the fourth and fifth of October, 
1813, to remain in the rear of the said Division, 
whereby the whole, or greater part of the said 
stores, Sec." fell into the enemy's hands, or w^ere de- 
stroyed, and the troops were without provisions for 
a whole day, previous to their being attacked on the 
said fifth of October ; fifthly, of having assured the 
Indian Chiefs that on their arrival at Chatham they 
would find the forks of the Thames fortified, and of 
having neglected to fortify them ; sixthly, of having 
neglected to occupy the heights above the Moravian 
Town, where it is said the enemy might have been 
engaaied to s^reat advantao;e, and of havins; formed 
the Division in a situation highly unfavourable to 
receive the attack which afterwards took place. 

It W'Ould be thought by a stranger to these transac- 
tions, perusing the charges and giving credit to them, 
that my conduct had been marked by the utmost 
remissness and inattention, and particularly that I 
had bestowed no care upon, and made no exertions 
to obtain information respecting the positions which 
the Division was to occupy. 

A distinct answer to these several grounds of 
charge, will be found in a plain narration of the cir- 
cumstances attend ins; the retreat. 



IS 

My determination originally was to make a stand 
at the Forks of the Thames, at Chatham. The fa- 
vourable opinion which I entertained of this position, 
I was the more conhrmed in by knowing that Gene- 
ral Simcoe, who had, during his government of the 
Upper Province, examined the country with the 
eye of an experienced and able General, was so 
much struck with the importance of this point, that 
he had, even in, those times of peace, erected a block 
house, the ruins of which still remain. 

It will be recollected, that, before leaving Sand- 
wich, I communicated to the only officer of Engi- 
neers belonging to the Division, my intention to 
throw up v.orks upon the Thames. The illness of 
that officer deprived me of his services till the 2d 
October, when I directed him to examine, with a 
view of defence, the ground at the forks of Chat- 
ham. On his return he represented it to me to be 
still less capable of being immediately made tenable 
than Dover, and spoke of the difficulties and time 
requisite to construct huts, &c. The state of the 
troops and the weather rendering it essential that 
they should, as far as possible, be under cover, I de- 
termined to occupy Dover, and directed, most posi- 
tively, that it should immediately be put into the best 
state of defence ; and in aid thereof, I appointed 
Captain Crowthers, 41st Regiment, of whose zeal 
and activity I was well aware, Assistant Engineer. 
I was the more confident that our troops could not 
be driven from Dover by the enemy, as the houses 
might have been occupied, and I had myself, at the 
river Raisin, witnessed the eflect of the resistance 
of a few resolute men, similarly though not advan- 
tageously posted. To the enquiries which I had 
made, respecting the Thames, to the officers, gene- 
rally of the right division, before leaving Sandwich, 
I had been answered, that the Thames afforded no 



19 

position ; but besides the knowledge which I had 
of the position at the Forks, Colonel Talbot had 
informed me, by letter, that the Moravian Town 
possessed great advantages, no intelligence being 
received of the advance of the enemy, from the Dra- 
goons detached in the rear of the retreating division, 
to watch their approach, I determined myself to ex- 
amine the Moravian village, and the adjoining 
grounds, placing Dragoons along the line, which I 
had to pass, that I might receive the earliest infor- 
mation of my presence being required. I received 
an express on the road, informing me of the appear- 
ance of the enemy's vessels on Lake Sinclair, I im- 
mediately returned, and on reconnoitring, ascer- 
tained the alarm to be unfounded— that the Troops 
had been removed from Trudel's to Dover — that no 
rear guard had been left, and that no steps had been 
taken to destroy the bridges. I immediately sent 
my Brigade Major to gain all the information he 
possiblycould respecting the enemy, and to break 
up the bridges. On his return, at ten o'clock, P.M. 
he reported that only one large vessel was in sight, 
at a considerable distance, — that no boats w^ere in 
sight, nor had any entered the Thames, — that he 
had, with the assistance of three inhabitants, broken 
up one of the bridges, and had posted Lieutenant 
Holmes with a party of Dragoons to patrole to the 
bridge and along the banks of the river, having pre- 
viously ordered them down for that purpose. On the 
morning of the second, accompanied by my Brigade 
Major,! rode about six miles below the post which 
the Division had precipitately retreated from, the 
day before, towards the entrance of the Thames, 
into the lake, on which we could see only one large 
vessel, and that a great distance ; from this and from 
reports, I conceived that vessel to be looking out for 

C 



20 

6ne of our vessels, the A^ancy, which was expected 
from Michilimackinac. Orders were given for a 
boat to be sent to the bridge that had been broken 
down, for the purpose of crossing any Indians that 
might have remained, and that Lieutenant Holmes 
should proceed with a party to destroy the other 
bridge at day-light the next morning. On the third 
of October, after having been informed by Captain 
Dixon that my orders were in a train of execution, 
and having no immediate expectation of the ap- 
proach of the enemy, I again attempted to see the 
Moravian village, accompanied by Captain Dixon 
and my Aid-de-Camp, and in this attempt was more 
successful. We arrived in the evening of the same 
day. I immediately examined, with Captain Dixon, 
the ground there ; and after the examination of the 
ground, it being too dark to attempt to return 
through bad roads that night, it was determined that 
we should leave the Moravian village as soon as it 
was sufficiently light in the morning of the fourth. 
Let my surprise be judged of, on the arrival of an 
express before day, on the morning of the fourth, 
from the Officer in the immediate command of the 
Troops, informing me that they had been withdrawn 
from Dover. This was the third movement of the 
Troops unsanctioned by me ; the first from La 
Vallee, which had its effects upon the minds of the 

Indians, and misfht have been attended with the most 

• • 1 
serious consequences at that critical moment ; the 

second from Trudels, an advantageous post for re- 
sisting the advance of the enemy, independently of 
the impropriety of not waiting for the Indians ; and 
this last from Dover, where our force would have 
been entire — where the confidence and aid of the 
Indians would have been undiminished, and on a 
ground well calculated for their mode of warfare. 



21 

It is to this unauthorised measure that are to be at- 
tributed many of our subsequent disasters, it ren- 
dered absolutely necessary the destruction of the 
vessels and stores which had been brought with 
so much trouble and exertion from Amherstburg, to 
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 
But for it, we should not have suffered the baneful 
effects which arose from having, after hours of in- 
activity, retired from a station even before the enemy 
had advanced, though ordered to fortify it for de- 
fence. The loss of the boats and the men in them 
could not have been sustained. No alternative was 
left to me but to adopt those disposhions which so 
new and unexpected a circumstance called for. In 
order to prevent the advance of the enemy's gun 
boats, and to impede his approach, I directed Cap- 
tain Hall, late of the Provincial Marine, to warp 
two vessels down to a proper part of the river, to 
scuttle and sink them across it, and burn them to 
the water's edge. Captain Hall having only left di- 
rections for my orders being carried into effect, it 
was done voluntarily by the Brigade Major and 
Captain Crowther. The Deputy Assistant Quarter 
Master General had directions to destroy every 
thing that could not be brought away, and which I 
believe w^as completely done. The boats I had no 
reason to believe to be in danger, nor, in fact, could 
they have been lost, if proper attention had been 
paid to them by those whose duty it was. The re- 
treat from Dover being unauthorised by me, can it 
be said that I shall be answerable for the accidents 
to which its precipitation may have given occasion ? 
And if this retreat had not been made, could the 
boats have been lost ? But setting this considera- 
tion aside, the boats containing ammunition and 
stores were not captured till the morning of the fifth 
of October, at about ten o'clock, A.M. The uflicer 



22 

immedialely responsible for them was the Deputy 
Assistant Quarter Master General, who having re- 
peatedly passed on the communication, must have 
been thoroughly acquainted with the navigation, and 
might be presumed to be attending to so essential 
and peculiar a part of his duty. They left Bowles' 
on the afternoon of the fourth. In the evening Ox 
that day they appear to have been within five miles 
of Therman's, where the Troops halted, and the 
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General states 
that he there reported the danger of the boats to the 
officer in the immediate command of the Troops. 
The danofer of the boats was asfain communicated 
to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 
and to the officer in the command, on the evening 
of the fourth, by Sergeant Grant. Instead of in- 
stantly affording assistance, the sergeant who came 
to seek aid was obliged to come to me, four miles, 
on foot, (although there was Cavahy with the Di- 
vision,) and when my orders were communicated 
to the officer in the immediate command of the 
Troops, about eight in the morning, my Brigade 
jMajor was told that the boats were already taken, 
and that he need not give himself any trouble about 
them, although in fact they were not then captured. 
The information which I had acquired of the situa- 
tion of the JMoravian village and the adjoining coun- 
try, became now highly valuable. I selected a po- 
sition which, taking into consideration my own force 
and that of the enemy, seemed to me to unite the 
greatest number of advantages. The enemy was 
strong in mounted men ; a position in a wood 
seemed to afford a sufficient protection for them ; 
their numerical superiority was considerable ; it 
was an object to confine them to a front not exceed- 
ing that which our force might offer. The position 
united these with several other great advantages. 



2:3 

Our right flank was protected by a morass, and a 
thick wood, whicli skirted the left flank of the ene- 
my. Our left rested on a river. To support the 
left flank, a gun was placed on the road running near 
the river. The Indians were to perform a service 
which in ground like this they were admirably fitted 
for, to turn the left flank, and get in rear of the ene- 
my. The troops were disposed in extended order, 
as used in woods in the last American war, in which 
I commenced my service. Their fire was thus not 
lost ; they were not unnecessarily exposed to the 
enemy, and they had the benefit of the same protec- 
tion of which the enemy availed themselves. A re- 
serve was formed — sharp-shooters and a small force 
of Dragoons were ordered to protect the gun ; the 
remainder of the Dragoons were posted at a short 
distance in the rear of the reserve. Guns, with the 
ofl^cer of the Artillery, were posted upon the heights 
in our rear, to protect a foi'd, by which alone we 
might have been turned upon the left and to support 
our retreat. This position was chosen in preference 
to that to the eastward of the JMoravian Town, for 
several very decisive reasons. We could not then 
have confined the enemy to the small ft'ont which 
our numbers would have permitted us to ofter. 
They might have turned our right flank, the ground 
did not possess the advantages which the position 
taken up by me possessed, for our strongest arm, 
the Indians. We had neither time nor means to 
throw up even a slight breast work, to protect the 
troops from the attack of the enemy, or to cover our 
right. The idea of occupying the village and the 
high grounds in the rear of us, with our small force, 
might be stated upon paper, but ought not to appear 
elsewhere. 

But why was not this last position taken originally 
in preference to Chatham or Dover ? 



24 

It appears from the preceding narration, that at 
the time ^vhen the retreat was determined upon, I 
had not had an opportunity of examining the Mora- 
vian Village. But if I had then possessed the know- 
ledge which I afterwards acquired, I could not have 
selected it. The vessels with the stores could not, 
from the nature of the navigation, have been brought 
thither. The Indians would not, in the first instance, 
have consented to retreat so far from their homes, 
and sufficient shelter could not have been afforded 
for the troops. In the position which I had so se- 
lected to meet the enemy near the Moravian Town, 
I awaited the attack with the utmost confidence that 
the result would be honourable to His Majesty's 
Arms, and to the Division under my command. It 
is necessary, however, for the understanding of the 
subject, that I should state the movements of the 
Indians after the Council of the twenty-eighth. 
When the retreat was commenced from Sandwich, 
the Indians had not joined us — many of them disbe- 
lieved the declaration of our intention to make a 
stand upon the Thames, and even the remainder en- 
tertained suspicions of a design to abandon the dis- 
trict. It was an object of the first moment to re- 
move the disbelief of the one and the suspicions of 
the other class ; a precipitation which the circum- 
stances did not call for, (the bridges over the Rivers 
Canard and Turkey, in the line of march of the 
enemy being destroyed,) would have confirmed 
both, and the retreat, instead of being too slow, as 
stated in the charge, was, in truth, more precipitate 
than I had intended. 

To convince the Indians of our intention to re- 
main true to them as long as they remained true to 
themselves, I had ordered the troops to halt at La- 
vall's, ten miles from Sandwich — an order which 
was not obeyed. The movement of the troops from 



25 

Lavall's, on the morning; of the l^venty-eighth, has 
not been sufficienily explained by the evidence on 
the part of the prosecution, and it is to be hoped that 
the evidence on the part of the defence will throw 
some new light upon it. It is clear that this preci- 
pitate movement produced a mischievous effect on 
the minds of the Indians. For the purpose of giving 
confidence to the Indians, I felt it advisable to sleep, 
on the night of the twenty-seventh, between the 
enemy and the Division. The main body of the 
Indians did not arrive at Trudcl's till the evening of 
the thirtieth, and many did not arrive till the first ; 
the destruction of the bridge would have answered 
no purpose but producing the worst possible effect 
upon the Indians. The exertions which were made 
by me for the destruction of the bridges as soon as 
it was proper, have already in part appeared ; the 
halts were necessary for the same purpose. 

The charge of having promised the Indians that 
they should find the Forks of the Thames fortified, 
and having neglected to do so, comes with a pecu- 
liar ill grace from the prosecution, who blame me in 
the first charge for not having broken all my promises 
to the Indians. I never made the promise here 
stated, but I told them that I should fortify the Forks. 

The key to a great variety of obstacles and em- 
barrassments to which I was exposed, is to be found 
in the strong disposition of a large portion of the offi- 
cers to retire from the territory. Hence the apathy, 
the indifference, with which my limited means were 
employed. What are the results of these facts ? 
Are they not, that the retreat from Dover being un- 
authorised, I cannot be answerable for the conse- 
quencesof it ? That upon this and every ground, 
the loss of the boats is not imputed to me. That 
every exertion was made by me for the destruction 



26 

of the bridges as soon as practicable, and that in 
reality they interposed no obstacle of any consider- 
ation to the advance of the enemy. That if the 
Thames was not fortified, no blame attaches to me, 
and that the position taken by me near INIoravian 
Town, was such as appeared, under all the circum- 
stances, the most advantageous. 

But I had almost forgotten the charge of suffering 
the division to be encumbered with useless bag- 

All the witnesses on the part of the prosecution 
itself have contradicted this charge. The prosecu- 
tor found himself at last obliged to attach himself to 
two waggons attending my family fi'om Dolson's — I 
myself being then at Sandwich, and having my time 
occupied with my public duties. ■ The attention of 
the prosecutor to the history of these waggons and 
their contents, might, in a more humble character, 
have deserved commendation, I, even I, the accused 
person, feel enough for the dignity of the prosecu- 
tion to Avish that they had not descended to this ; I 
feel enough for their chai-acter for humaniry, to wish 
that they had not seemed to reproach me for allow- 
ing the unfortunate inhabitants of the district to carry 
away from it the little property which they could 
save from the enemy. But I cannot condescend to 
offer any observations upon the evidence produced, 
it must be supposed with the intention to support 
this charge, I cannot forbear from asking ? 

Where are the persons who have circulated so 
many calumnies respecting my baggage ? 

What is, become of the public reproach that the 
Army was encumbered with an unmanageable load 
of forbidden private baggage 7 

The only remaining charge, the fifth, will occupy 
but little of the time of the Court. 

In it I am accused of not having, either prior or 



27 

subsequent to the attack of the enemy on the fifth of 
October, made the military arrangements best ad- 
apted to meet or assist the said attack, and that 
during the action, and after the troops had given 
way, I did not make any effectual attempt to rally 
or encourage them, or to co-operate with or support 
the Indians who were engaged with the enemy on 
the right. Here again my defence will be a mere 
narration of facts. In my answer to the preceding 
charge, I have stated the manner in which the troops 
were formed to meet the attack of the enemy. In- 
dian scouts were sent in front of the line and across 
the river, to watch the enemy's approach. The 
enemy were reconnoitred by my own Staff and Offi- 
cers of the Light Dragoons. I myself had previous- 
ly reconnoitred them. It was at this time that I as- 
certained that the ammunition for the troops, which 
ought to have been conveyed with the Artillery, and 
for which waggons had been provided, had been, in 
consequence of an act of forgetfulness of the Officer 
of Artillery, conveyed by water, and had been lost. 
I immediately took measures for supplying this un- 
fortunate omission, as appears by my letter to JNIajor 
General De Rottenburg, which w^as sent from the 
ground by I\lr. Wood, Clerk of Ordnance Stores. 
But what were the dispositions subsequent to the 
attack which I had omitted to make ? I had every 
reason to believe that the advance of the enemy's 
mounted men along the road would have been 
checked by the gun. I could not suppose that their 
attack upon our line in the road could have been 
successful. I could not even suppose that it would 
be made. The enemy's General himself declares 
that it was a measure not sanctioned by any thing 
that he had ever seen or heard of. My surprise 
and disappointment may be easily conceived on 

D 



28 

finding; tluil the gun upon which so mucli depended, 
had been deserted wiUiout an effort,— that the lirst 
Hne, after having discharged their pieces without 
orders, had given way, and were dispersed, in a 
manner to preclude all hope of their being again 
formed, which was instantly followed by the disper- 
sion of the second line. Although every etfort 
seemed now to be hopeless, I urged the first line, by 
all the sentiments of shame and of duty, to meet the 
enemy. It was unavailing. The arrangements 
which seemed to secure victory were thus turned 
against myself. The mounted men ought, accord- 
ino- to every idea, to have been driven back upon the 
Infantry, and have produced a confusion of which 
the Indians would have availed themselves. The 
line breaking so unexpectedly, the very circum- 
stances of their mode of attack, which ought to have 
ensured the defeat of the enemy, rendered their 
success the more complete. In this situation, what 
was left for me ? Was I to remain without any 
other hope but that of adding one more trophy to 
those, which the enemy had acquired 7 All hopes 
of reti-ieving the day were past. Soldiers who can 
appreciate "the feehngs witii which I left that field,^ 
into which I had entered with a full confidence of 
victory, will not think that life was valuable enough 
to be preserved at any expense, still less at that of 
honour, where accidents and misconduct of the 
troops so cruelly disappointed my hopes. I have 
answered this charge according to the appa- 
rent intent of it; but "the very language of it con- 
tains its own refutation. I did not, it is said, make 
tiic best arrangements for repulsing the enemy. 
What were those arrangements ? 

The Prosecutor here observes a prudent silence, 
—and of an oflence like this, who is there that has 



29 
not been iiuiltv. Perfection belons>;s not to humanity. 

111! 

Let the diversities of human opinions be looked to, 
and who is there that must not tremble if this can be 
construed into a crime ? I did not make any ef- 
fectual attempt to rally the Troops — the attempt 
made by me was not effectual. But was this a 
crime ? Courts Martial claim an honourable ex- 
emption from those formalities which so frecjuently 
impede the course of justice in other Courts. 
But the substance is never there forgotten, and 
what belongs more to the substance than that 
offences should be distinctly stated ; none is here 
stated. If I were to admit myself guilty of the fifth 
charge, no punishment could be awarded. On the 
other hand, when I have insinuations only to answer, 
the Prosecution protect themselves under them, and 
I am deprived of the fair advantage of exposing their 
calumny. I ought to apologize to the Court for 
taking up so much of their time with all the advan- 
tages which the outcry produced by the General 
Order of the 24th November, with all the advantages 
which have been derived from the examination of 
my own witnesses by the Prosecutor, (for the Pro- 
secutor has not thought it inconsistent with propriety 
to resort to this novel practice, and the importance 
which he attaches to the conviction which he is de- 
sirous of obtaining, may perhaps justify it in his 
eyes.) I am obliged to make this apology. If any 
ordinary interest had been concerned, I should not 
have taken up the time of the Court with the exa- 
mination of one witness, still less with this defence. 
I am, at the same time, not insensible of the disad- 
vantage which I have to encounter in explaining my 
views, as to transactions upon which a new light has 
been thrown by these results, which at the time of 
forming my determination I could, of course, not 
know. 



30 

I have a satisfaction, however, in being able ta 
shew, by the correspondence w^hich I lay before you> 
that the views which I have above stated, are those 
which governed me, and that those views are not 
confined to myself. I cannot conclude without re- 
marking my peculiar ill-fortune. If my recommen- 
dations respecting Presque Isle had been attended 
to, that IVavy would have been destroyed. After 
the loss of our own Fleet, and the necessity of a 
retreat became evident, the resistance of the Troops 
and Indians at Dover ought to have been, and would, 
in all probability, have been successful. Again, 
near the Moravian Town, accident and misconduct 
deprived me of a victory which seemed certain* 
Lengthy as I may have seemed to be to some, I 
have omitted many circumstances of minor impor- 
tance, not to trespass too much upon the time of the 
Court. My defence would have been shorter, if I 
had not been anxious that each member of this 
Court should leave it satisfied that my conduct has 
been that of a zealous officer, and one upon whom 
the experience of service had not been entirely 
thrown away. 

My honour is in your hands, and I feel it is safe 
there. 



31 

Mr. President, and Gentlemen of this Honourable Court : 

The evidence, as well on the part of the prosecu- 
tion, as on my own part, being now closed, it re- 
mains for me to olFer such observations upon it as 
appear to be material. 

It will contribute to a clear view of the evidence, 
if the charges are first separately stated and the evi- 
dence applicable to each examined. 

In the first charge it is said, " that I, being en- 
" trusted with the command of the right division of 
" the Army serving in the Canadas, and the retreat 
" of the said division from the western parts ot Up- 
" per Canada, having become unavoidable, from the 
" loss of the Fleet on Lake Erie, on the 10th Sep- 
" tember, did not make the military arrangements 
" best calculated for promptly eftecting such re- 
" treats, and unnecessarily delayed to commence 
" the same until the evening of the 27th of the said 
" month, on which day the enemy had landed in 
" considerable force within a short distance of 
" Sandwich, the head-quarters of the division." 

The reasons which induced me to defer com- 
mencing the retreat until the 27th September, are 
fully stated in my defence. These reasons have 
been established and supported by the strongest evi- 
dence. The number of Indian warriors within the 
district which 1 commanded, is proved by Captain 
Caldwell and Mr. Jones, (whose means of informa- 
tion on this point were the best,) to have been from 
three to four thousand. All the officers of the In- 
dian Department concur in saying that if I had re- 
treated from the western parts of Upper Canada im- 
mediately after the loss of the Fleet was known ta 
me, without the concurrence of the Indians, they 
would, in all probability, have laid waste the coun- 
try, and perhaps have even attacked the division 



32 

under my command. It was with the greatest difii- 
ciihy that a portion of them was induced to retreat 
to the mouth of the Thames. None of the Indian 
Department would propose to them to retreat from 
the western parts of Upper Canada, for they had 
taken up the hatchet for the purpose of extending 
their boundaries, and from the year 1795 they had 
entertained suspicions of our sincerity. The very 
proposal to retreat from, the western parts of Upper 
Canada, would have been worse than useless ; it 
would have made them our most inveterate enemies. 
The speech of Tecumseh affords the best evidence 
of the feelings of the Indians. " We will defend," 
said he, " our lands with our lives, and if such be 
the will of the Great Spirit, we will leave our bones 
upon them." Would this Chief, whose example 
and talents governed the councils of his brethren, 
have consented to abandon those lands, which he 
expressed with so much energy his determination to 
defend ? Would not the suspicions of himself 
and his brethren have been confirmed by the 
very proposal 1 And would we not, then, 
have been considered by them as their enemies ? 
Those persons who have had the best means of be- 
coming acquainted with their character and disposi- 
tions, state it as their opinions that they could not in 
the first instance have been induced to retreat even 
as far as the Moravian Village. 

Colonel Caldwell, who had served with them so 
far back as the year 1773, who was personally 
known to and esteemed by their Chiefs, and had 
several sons fighting in their ranks, perceived such 
marks of discontent in them, upon the retreat to the 
Thames only, being determined upon, that he did 
not think even his family safe within the district, 
and sent all of them, who were too young to take 
the field, to Lower Canada. 



33 

It is proved that the greateat ex})cditiun was used 
in convening the Councils whicii the scattered man- 
ner of living of the Indians, and their peculiar na- 
tional manners, would permit. 

Many of them could not be crossed over from 
the Detroit side, until the 29th of September, and 
the main body only came up with the Army on the 
30th September, and many not until the 1st Octo- 
ber. I could not, therefore, have left Sandwich 
before the 27th, without abandoning the Indian Al- 
liance and producing consequences of the most 
alarming nature. 1 will not again take up the time 
of the Court in detailing the arrangements made by 
me, in consequence of my determination to retreat 
to the Thames. They are stated in the defence 
which I have laid before the Court, and have been 
satisfactorily proved, as well as others not mentioned 
in it. 

But I have said that even if it had been in my 
power to commence the retreat before the 27th 
September, without making the great sacrifices 
which such a measure would have called for, I 
should not have been justified in doing so. We are 
all naturally disposed to think those measures un- 
wise which prove ultimately to be unsuccesful, even 
thoudi their want of means be due to accident or 
to unforeseen circumstances. It is with difficulty 
that we can place ourselves in the situation of the 
actors, and justly appreciate the reasons which have 
determined their conduct ; for the results, particu- 
larly when they are unfortunate, throw a shade over 
objects, so that the most experienced eye can hardly 
distinguish their original colours. 

I, therefore, cannot but consider myself as pecu- 
liarly fortunate in having it in my power to shew, 
by official documents, that the reasons which deter- 



34 

mined my mind were not confined to myself, but 
were the plain dictates of prudence, sanctioned by 
all who had the best means of judging, but who, like 
myself, could judge only from probabilities. 

The letters of Colonel Harvey, Adjutant General 
with the Centre Division, of the 6th and 17th Sep- 
tember, 1813, the letter of Major General Baynes, 
Adjutant General of North America, of the 18th 
September, 1813, and the despatch of his Excel- 
lency Sir George Prevost, the Commander in Chief 
of the Forces, of the 8th October, 1813, all serve to 
shew that I ought not, that I could not, commence 
my retreat before the 27th September. 

But to conclude with this charge ; let it be sup- 
posed for one instant that I had adopted the line of 
conduct which the Prosecution seems here to con- 
sider as the only wise and proper one : let it be 
supposed that immediately after the loss of the 
Fleet was known to me, I had made the military ar- 
rangements best calculated for promptly effecting 
my retreat from the western part of Upper Canada, 
aud had not delayed the commencement of it, and 
had promptly effected it ; let it be supposed further, 
that I had stood chariired with this dereliction of 
duty, (and no one who looks at the map of the 
country, or the correspondence, or the evidence 
before the Court, can doubt but that I should and 
ought to have been so,) what might not then have 
been the language of the prosecution? You com- 
manded an Army — small, it is true, but valorous and 
well disci])lined: you were supported by a firm 
band of Indian warriors. The loss of the squadron 
could not alFect you so immediately as to render a 
precipitate retrograde movement necessary. Every 
effort should have been made, and every device 
used, before this measure was resorted to. You 



35 

knew that you kept in check a large force of the 
enemy. By your movement to the Centre Division, 
you took away this check. You virtually directed 
the enemy to land at Long Point, where they might 
at once have intercepted the retreat of your Divi- 
sion, and get into the rear of the Centre Division, 
then in a situation the most critical. You have 
broken the faith of Government, pledged to the In- 
dian warriors. You have exposed to their fury the 
peaceable inhabitants of the District which you com- 
manded: their blood is upon your head. You have 
sacrificed the Centre Division of the Army, and 
with it all that is worth possessing of Upper Canada. 
And all this before the enemy landed in the terri- 
tory — before it was certain that he would land 
there. You should have preserved unbroken the 
spirit of the British officer. You should have 
placed a dignified reliance upon your Government, 
and have known that your conduct in the trying cir- 
cumstances in which you were placed would be 
judged with candour. 

What answer could I have made to a charge like 
this ? I must have bowed down my head in shame 
and confusion, and have been silent. Yet I stand 
accused in the charge which the Courtis here called 
upon to determine for not adopting this very line of 
conduct. 

In the second charge it is alleged, that after com- 
mencing the retreat of the division on the 27th Sep- 
tember, although I had reason to believe that the 
enemy would immediately follow it with very supe- 
rior numbers, and endeavour to harass and impede 
its march, I did not use due expedition, or take 
the proper measures for conducting the said retreat, 
having encumbered the said division with large 
quantities of useless baggage — having unnecessarily 

E 



36 

halted the troops for several whole days, and having 
omitted to destroy the bridges over which the enemy 
would be obliged to pass, thereby affording them 
an opportunity to come up with the said division. 
The word immedialeli/ used in this charge requires 
some explanation. The enemy had landed five or 
six miles below Amherstburgh on the afternoon of 
the 27th September — that is, about twenty-three 
miles from Sandwich, whence the right division 
commenced its retreat on the afternoon or evening 
of the same day, when it marched ten miles. Two 
bridges in the line of march of the enemy, Turkey 
and Canard, had been destroyed. The heavy stores 
had been conveyed to the Thames before the retreat 
was commenced. I had, therefore, not reason to 
believe that the enemy would follow us so imme- 
diately as the charge would seem to imply. 

The words " very superior numbers" in this 
charge, require also some explanation. The evi- 
dence upon this point is fortunately very satisfactory. 
Mr. Holmes, when examined on the part of the 
prosecution, states, from memory, that he reported 
five thousand as the numbers of the enemy on the 
27th September. On reference to his report, how- 
ever, which was produced and proved by himself on 
the defence, it will be seen that his memory (which 
after so long an interval of time is not surprising,) 
had failed him as to numbers, and that his report 
was above three thousand men. It will be seen, on 
reference to official documents connected with the 
right division of the Army, that this force was not 
one which ought to have excited very great alarm. 
After these explanations we may proceed to the 
substance of the charge. I am charged, first, with 
having encumbered the division with large quantities 
of useless baggage. This charge is not only not 



37 

supported by evidence, but is positively and directly 
contradicted by all the witnesses on the part of the 
prosecution and defence, who had any opportunity 
of knowing anything of the matter. So far from the 
division being encumbered with large quantities of 
useless baggage, there was none with it, at a time 
w^hen there were several spare waggons. 

I am charged, secondly, with having unnecessarily 
halted the troops for several whole days, and having 
omitted to destroy the bridges over which the enemy 
would be obliged to pass, thereby affording them an 
opportunity to come up with the said division. I 
trust that the evidence has sufiiciently explained this 
charge. The halts of the troops, it will appear, 
were made with the view of obtaining the assistance 
of the Indian warriors, with the view also of satisfy- 
ing them that we were not deserting the district, for- 
feiting the faith pledged to them by the Govern- 
ment. Was this unnecessary ? The bridges which 
were omitted to be destroyed interposed no obsta- 
cle of any consideration to the advance of the ene- 
my. The destruction of them would have deprived 
us of the Indian aid. The first is proved by the 
evidence on the part of the prosecution — the last by 
those whose opinions upon this point are entitled to 
the utmost consideration — the Indian Department. 
And would it have been wise to destroy these bridges, 
from which the enemy would have suffered much less 
than we ourselves should have done ? They would 
have been retarded a few hours — we should have 
lost the Indian aid, and should, in all probabilit}', 
have been exposed to their hostility. All these 
bridges of any importance were, in fact» destroyed, 
and the whole of the evidence proves that this ob- 
ject was not lost sight of, as far as was consistent 
with objects of infinitely higher importance. 



38 

In the third charge I am accused of not having 
taken the necessary measures for affording security 
to the boats, waggons, and carts laden with the am- 
munition, stores, and provisions required ibr the 
troops on their retreat, and allowed the said boats, 
waggons, and carts, on the 4th and 5th October, 
1813, to remain in the rear of the said division, 
w^hereby the whole or greater part of the said am- 
munition, stores, and provisions either fell into the 
enemy's hands or was destroyed, to prevent its 
capture, and the troops were without provisions for 
a whole day, previous to their being attacked on the 
5th of October. I have already stated that findinof 
that the Forks at Chatham would have taken up 
some time to put into a state of defence, I had de- 
termined to make a stand at Dover : as connected 
with this determination the Moravian Village was an 
object of the first importance. It secured our line 
of communication for provisions ; it served to pro- 
tect our rear, and our sick might have been in secu- 
rity there. In the event of our being dislodged from 
Dover, we might have retreated to it. These were 
the considerations which determined me to take 
measures for erecting works at the Moravian Vil- 
lage, confidently expecting that if the enemy ven- 
tured to attack us at Dover, they would be repulsed 
with loss. My arrangements were principally with 
a view to the lower parts of the Thames. I did not 
anticipate that a retreat from Dover would be so 
precipitate. It cannot, therefore, excite surprise, if, 
when that event occurred, I found myself under the 
necessity of forwarding stores by water. The cir- 
cumstances of the capture of these stores have al- 
ready been so fully stated in the defence which has 
been laid before the Court, that it would be trespass- 
ing upon their time to repeat them. It is suflrcient 



39 

to say, that the evidence fully establishes what I 
stated. The prosecution appears to consider that 
my object, in the first instance, was to proceed to 
the Moravian Village. This neither was nor could 
be my object. The Indians could not, in the first 
instance, have been induced to go so far. From the 
nature of the navigation, the stores could not have 
been conveyed thither within the time which I had 
at my command ; the troops would have been with- 
out cover. These objections were in themselves 
insuperable, but over and above them I had not 
had the means of becoming acquainted with the po- 
sition to justify me in adopting this resolution, if 
these obstacles, great as they were, had been sur- 
mounted. This charge concluded with stating that 
the troops were without provisions for a whole day 
previous to their being attacked on the 5th October. 
This statement is directly and positively contra- 
dicted, both by the evidence on the prosecution 
and on the defence. The troops being without 
bread on the morning of the 5th, is fully explained 
by Mr. Gilmore ; and it is also in evidence, that as 
soon as this came to my knowledge I took imme- 
diate measures for supplying their wants. The tes- 
timony of Mr. Gilmore, and of several other wit- 
nesses, sufliciently shews that there was no want of 
attention on my part to the provisioning of the 
troops. 

The fourth charge accuses me with havino; assured 
the Indian Chiefs in Council, at Amherstburg, as an 
inducement to them and to their warriors to accom- 
pany the division in its retreat, that on their arrival 
at Chatham they should find the Forks at Chatham 
fortified ; I did nevertheless neglect to fortify the 
same ; that I also neglected to occupy the heights 
above the Moravian Village, although the ordnance, 



40 

with the exception of one six-pounder, had been 
previously removed to that position, where, by 
throwing up works, the attack of the enemy might 
have been awaited, and they might have been en- 
gaged to sreat advanta2;e ; and that after intelhsience 
had reached me of the approach oi the enemy on 
the morning of the 5th October, I halted the divi- 
sion, notwithstanding it was within two miles of the 
said village, and formed it in a situation highly un- 
favourable for receiving the attack which afterwards 
took place. No promise was ever made by me that 
the Indian warriors should find the Forks of the 
Thames fortified, nor is there any evidence to that 
efTect. I certainly said it was my intention to throw 
up works there, and the reason why that intention 
was abandoned has, in the previous stage of the 
proceedings, been fully stated. It is a little extra- 
ordinary that the prosecution, who, in the first 
charge, blame me for not at once sacrificing the 
public faith so often pledged to the Indians, should, 
in this charge, make it a crime not to have performed 
a promise which had never been made. 

The reasons which determined me to occupy the 
position on which the engagement took place, in 
preference to the heights above the Moravian Village, 
have received the most ample confirmation from the 
evidence which has been offered. It has been 
proved that our right could have been turned if we 
had occupied the heights ; it has been proved, too, 
by evidence entitled to the greatest consideration, 
that we should there have been deprived of our 
strongest arm— the Indian warriors. The ordnance 
near the Moravian Village was posted there for the 
purpose of defending the ford and village, and to 
cover the retreat, in the event of the division being 
forced from the position which was occupied. 



41 

The abandonment of the gun rendered all the ar 
rangements which had been previously made fruit- 
less, and joined with the precipitate flight of the 
troops, gave to the undisciplined cavalry oi the ene- 
my an effect which could not have been anticipated. 
The clue to this precipitate flight may be found in 
the half-yearly confidential reports to Lieutenant 
General Drummond, which I hope to have it in my 
power to lay before the Court. The preceding nar- 
rative contains the most prominent parts of a retreat, 
conducted under circumstances of peculiar embar- 
rassment and privations, with a force on every ac- 
count not the most disposable. In the situation in 
which I stood, it must be obvious that the difhculties 
naturally and inseparably attendant upon retrograde 
movements, were here augmented to a tenfold de- 
gree. But it was my duty to exercise my best dis- 
cretion and to pursue the hne of conduct which the 
public interest seemed to me to require, without 
being biassed either by considerations of personal 
ease or even the good and evil opinion of others. 
That line of conduct I have pursued, and it is a cir- 
cumstance of hi2:h satisfaction to me that those who 
even think that I erred in my determination, if any 
such there be, must, at the same moment, feel what 
they consider as an error was an honest determina- 
tion proceeding from zeal for the service, and the 
very opposite to what regard for my own ease should 
have directed. 

The four first charges which I have gone through, 
relate almost entirely to alleged errors of judgment. 

The fifth is of a very diff"erent complexion. In 
the form rather of secret insinuations than of open 
and public accusations, it attacks my character both 
as an officer and a man • in its most vital parts. I 
did not, it is alleged in this charge, make any effec- 



42 

tual attempt, in my own person or otherwise, to rally 
or encourage the troops during the action and after 
they had given way, or to co-operate with and sup- 
poit the Indians, who were engaged with the enemy 
on the right, I having, it is said, quitted the field 
soon after the action commenced. A perusal of the 
evidence would produce an impression that the wit- 
nesses on the part of the prosecution and on the 
defence contradicted each other in their statements 
relating to this charge. A more attentive examina- 
tion of it will remove this impression. The vari- 
ances between them will be found to consist prin- 
cipally in their measurement of time — to which all 
were equally liable to error, even when the occur- 
rences were passing under their eyes, and still more 
so when they were to be recalled to their recollec- 
tion after an interval of more than a year. When 
the different points of view from which they were 
seen — the different feelings with which they were 
examined, are taken into consideration, — and when, 
over and above, it is recollected that more than a 
year had elapsed since the events took place, the 
concurrence of the testimony as to all essential 
points is truly surprising. 

The Brigade Major and my Aid-de-Camp state 
my having ridden to the first line just before the 
firing commenced. Mr. LaRoque met me riding 
up to the first line, and being then between the two 
lines, Mr. Lefevre and Adjutant Fitzgerald saw me 
in rear of the first line when the firinsr commenced. 
The other evidences merely negative their having 
seen me, but do not deny that I was there. How 
did the firing commence, and what w^as the effect of 
it upon the first line ? Colonel Warburton says, 
the troops fired immediately after the enemy's rifle- 
men had commenced firing. I do not think the first 



43 

line loaded a second time, but immediately dispersed, 
some to the second line, some to the woods, and in 
another place the line gave way as the cavalry ap- 
peared ; there were a great many light troops skir- 
misliino; at the time. The cavalry was the lirst that 
came clown, but it was after the line gave w^ay. 
Major I\ruir, after speaking of the limber of the gun 
passing the second line, says, nearly at the same 
time the men of the first line ran back to the second 
in rear of it, and a number of the enemy's horsemen 
close after them. Captain Chambers says, I was 
with the first line when the enemy advanced: they 
broke us soon ; the charge was very rapid. And to 
another question he answers, that the first line was 
broken almost immediately ; some men on the left 
did not fire more than once ; some on the right fired 
tw^o rounds. All the witnesses, both on the prose- 
cution and defence, concur in this statement, except 
Col. Evans, who says that the dismounted infantry 
and the cavalry were actually penetrating through it 
when the first line broke. Was any attempt made by 
me in my own person or otherwise to rally the 
troops 1 Capt. Dixon and Adjt. Fitzgerald, on the 
prosecution,Cor. Lefevre and my own personal Staff, 
speak to my attempts to rally the troops. The at- 
tempts of officers of the Regiment is spoken to by 
several witnesses, and all concur in saying no at- 
tempt could have been effectual. Captain Cham- 
bers is the only one who says that no attempts were 
made by me to rally the troops in front of the second 
line. But independently of the positive testimony 
a2;ainst this assertion, it will be recollected that he 
states that he retired with the men endeavouring lo 
collect them. Under what circumstances did the 
second line break 7 Major Muir, who commanded 
that line, after mentioning that the men of the first 



44 

line ran back to tlie second in rear of it, and a num- 
ber of the enemy's horsemen close after it, adds, 
" the second line fired, and before they had time to 
load, the enemy's horse went through them." Cap- 
tain Chambers says, " that the fire of the second 
line checked the enemy ; immediately, however, he 
advanced in such force that the second line was di- 
rectly broken." Colonel Evans thinks that this fire 
did not check the enemy. Adjutant Fitzgerald de- 
scribes this fire as a strao-fflins; fire, as also does Ma- 
jor of Brigade Hall; Captain Bullock, as a fire 
oblique to the left ; and Lieutenant M'Lean, as a 
running fire, as regular as circumstances would ad- 
mit of. It was at the moment this fire was delivered 
that I was passing the left flank of the reserve, and 
all concur in saying that the reserve, after delivering 
its fire, was immediately penetrated at all points and 
captured. iVnd if I was not myself taken, it was 
only owing to an accident which choked up the road. 
Captain LaRoque saw me a very short tim.e before he 
was himself made a prisoner, and states when I 
passed him the firing had ceased, except on the 
right, where it will be recollected the Indians were 
engaged, and between v.hom and us the enemy's 
cavalry was. The testimony of the witnesses re- 
specting the length of time which intervened be- 
tween the first fire and the complete dispersion of 
the troops is, as might be expected, very different, 
some stating it from ten minutes to a quarter of an 
hour ; others, at two and a half and three and four 
minutes. I will not take up the time of the Court 
in commenting upon this evidence, as the fact does 
not appear to be very material ; but the weight of 
probability and of evidence is in favour of the shorter 
period. And how, I may be permitted to ask, was 
it possible, under these circumstances, to co-operate 



RD ^^ 



45 

with or support the Indians upon the right ? It is 
plain that from the manner in wliich the troops were 
dispersed, and the description of force by which they 
were pursued, the few who could eftcct their escape 
could only do so by retreating into the woods with 
the Indians, and that it would have been madness to 
expect to rally them at the J\f oravian Village. Next 
to the pain of being found guilty of a charge like 
this, (if one who was guilty could feel any pain,) is 
that of being accused, particularly in an officer who 
has served many years, he trusts without discredit. 
The satisfaction of being able to justify himself is 
far from healing the wound. My justification I have 
sought for in the evidence of the prosecution itself, 
andl have found it there — for truth is easily found. 
But I can never forget the charge. I turn with plea- 
sure from this subject to the grateful reflection that, 
by the decision of an honourable and impartial ii-i- 
bunal, a period will be at least put to secret asper- 
sions and open attacks, from which I have, for the 
last twelve months, so much suffered. 



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